We investigate the notion of classical negation from a non-classical perspective. In particular, one aim is to determine what classical negation amounts to in a paracomplete and paraconsistent four-valued setting. We first give a general semantic characterization of classical negation and then consider an axiomatic expansion BD+ of four-valued Belnap-Dunn logic by classical negation. We show the expansion complete and maximal. Finally, we compare BD+ to some related systems found in the literature, specifically a four-valued modal logic of Béziau and the logic of classical implication and a paraconsistent de Morgan negation of Zaitsev.
Introduction
One of the initial motivations behind the system of first-degree entailment, or Belnap-Dunn logic (BD), was to avoid fallacies of classical material implication, such as the so-called fallacies of relevance. Two such instances are embodied in the following theorems of classical logic:
It would seem, then, that paraconsistent and relevant logicians should have no interest in classical material implication or classical negation, at least not if they wish to avoid fallacies such as these. There are, however, plenty of good reasons for paraconsistent logicians to be interested in these classical notions. One prominent example of such interest goes back to Routley and Meyer in the series of articles (see [16, 17] ) where they consider adding classical negation to relevant logic, resulting in what they there called classical relevant logic. Their reason was mainly a technical curiosity: Does adding classical negation to relevant logic result in what they called "breakdown", i.e. a collapse to classical logic? The answer, they showed, was "No" and, better, that the expansion to classical negation is even conservative.
Are there other reasons for a paraconsistentist to be interested in classical negation? Let us first consider a related question: Why would (revisionist) paraconsistists care about metalogical results concerning paraconsistent logics couched in a classical metatheory? R. K. Meyer's answer was "to preach to the gentiles in their own tongue".
1 If classicists claim not to grasp paraconsistent negation as being a genuine negation, 2 why not deliver the logic to them in terms of a semantics expressed entirely within a classical metatheory? And that is precisely what relevantists did. We think it is even better to go one step further by having all classical notions expressible in the object language itself. What better way to preach to the gentiles in their own tongue?
3 If a classical notion is coherently expressible in your language, why not help yourself to it? Paraconsistentists might be interested in classical notions simply because they find them coherent.
We are aware that a good number of paraconsistentists have an aversion to certain classical notions, especially negation and implication. We think, however, that this aversion stems from a misunderstanding that classical notions-and in particular negation-somehow lead to triviality in a suitably rich language. First, paraconsistent logics with classical negation need not collapse into classical logic, and so naive theories of truth or sets couched in these languages needn't be trivial provided they are formulated in the right way. 4 Second, it is hard to see how certain paraconsistentists can deny the coherence of classical negation, in which case there is no reason to deny it its place in one's formal (object) language. Certainly if such a language is to serve as one in which much of natural language can be regimented, then if classical negation is coherent, one must allow it into their formal language for the sake of expressive adequacy.
Finally, a language which succeeds in evading paradox only because it lacks expressive resources serves as no solution to paradox. One cannot hope to avoid untoward consequences of one's theory by simply ignoring notions one deems problematic, at least not if those notions are coherent (or one has not shown that they are incoherent). Since this is no place to defend the coherence of classical negation, for present purposes we simply assume it. We will, however, say more about what classical negation amounts to in a non-classical setting, a topic we come to in the following section.
The aim of this paper is three-fold. First, to motivate a semantic characterization of classical negation applicable to non-classical logics (Sect. 2). Second, to investigate an axiomatization of the extension of BD by said classical negation (Sect. 3). Third, to compare the resulting extension to related systems found in the literature (Sect. 3.5).
What is Classical Negation?
We have been using "classical negation" within the context of non-classical logics without saying exactly what we mean by it. Before extending BD by classical negation, we need to say precisely what we take classical negation to be. One typically finds a definition according to which classical negation is any operation ¬ satisfying certain "characteristic" laws, e.g.
But such a characterization depends crucially on what sort of conditional → is, and which laws are taken to be characteristic of classical negation. For instance, if → is not the classical material conditional, then even if ¬ satisfies the above laws, it may not satisfy others thought to be characteristically classical, such as the following form of contraposition 5 :
The point is that it is especially difficult to say in a purely syntactic way which laws are characteristic of negation, depending on which other sentential operators we have in the background. If we have only a relevant conditional around, how should classical negation interact with it? It is for this reason that we examine the notion of classicality from a semantic perspective. 5 See e.g. [16] , where what is there called 'classical negation' fails precisely this law when → is a relevant conditional. 6 Additional reasons for preferring a semantic over syntactic characterization of negation are given in [9, Chap. 2].
Contradictoriness
Since we will be working with BD, let us begin with the truth tables for its connectives:
A ∨ B t b n f t t t t t b t b t b n t t n n f t b n f Note here that designated values are t ("truth only") and b ("both truth and falsity"), and that ∼ is a paraconsistent negation. The values f and n are to be taken as "falsity only" and "neither truth nor falsity". Thus, when we speak of a sentence being true, we mean it takes either the value t or b, and when we speak of a sentence being false, we mean it takes either the value b or f. Indeed we take there to be only two genuine truth values, truth and falsity, that are neither exhaustive nor exclusive. Thus, for instance, by the assignment of the value b to A we are to understand that A is related to both truth and falsity, not that there is some further truth value, "bothtruth-and-falsity", in relation to which A stands. If helpful, the reader may think of the four values as sets of values consisting of just truth and falsity so that, e.g., b = {truth, falsity}. Typically one thinks of t and f as classical values, and the others as non-classical. As such, we may then say of a pair of formulas A and B that:
Contra: A and B are classically contradictory if and only if A ∨ B is always true and not false and A ∧ B is always false and not true.
Contra generalizes the usual notion of contradictoriness to allow for a nonclassical understanding of the relation between truth and falsity, i.e. whether they're exhaustive or exclusive. It also uniquely determines a contradictoryforming connective whose truth table is given by
Indeed, from an algebraic viewpoint ¬ is boolean complementation.
We criticized syntactic characterizations of negation since they rely crucially on what properties certain connectives have. Here we have proposed a characterization, Contra, which relies on the properties ∧ and ∨ have. The difference is that we are assuming An alternative notion of classical negation in the context of BD, often called exclusion negation, has the following truth table:
It is often read as 'It is not true that. . . ', keeping in mind that taking the value b means being both true and false. 8 It is thought of as classical since the logic in ∧, ∨ and ¬ e is precisely classical logic. 9 It is easily verified that the logic in ∧, ∨, and ¬ too coincides with classical logic. Note, however, that ¬ e fails to satisfy Contra, and so is not a contradictory forming operator in that sense, since A ∨ ¬ e A takes the value b (instead of t) when b is assigned to A. Moreover, once we add the paraconsistent negation ∼ to the language, ¬ e and ¬ come apart, as witnessed by Proposition 4 below. One problem with the above characterization of classical negation as one satisfying Contra is that the definition does not generalize, e.g. to a threevalued setting. For suppose we have only three values, t, b, and f. (It will not matter whether b is designated.) In order to meet Contra, a classical negation must take t to f and conversely. Now what to do with b? It can't go to f, lest A ∨ A not always take t. And it can't go to b or t either, lest A ∨ A not always take t or A ∧ A not always take f. In other words, there is no operation satisfying Contra in a three-valued setting. If we wish our characterization of classical negation to apply when there are arbitrarily many values, we need a more general notion of classical contradictoriness. For that, we propose the following account; call it Liberal.
Contrariety: two sentences are contraries if one of them is not true whenever the other is true;
Footnote 7 continued with most others that ∧ and ∨ behave classically-algebraically as meet and join-and we already know how classical negation interacts with these connectives. Apart from any semantic considerations, it is not clear, however, how classical negation should interact with e.g. a relevant arrow. 8 The expression 'exclusion negation' typically refers to a connective in a three-valued setting with the same reading, 'It is not true that'. We have lifted the terminology to the four-valued case. 9 For our purposes, a logic is a set of formulae closed under an appropriate relation of deducibility satisfying e.g. transitivity, reflexivity and substitution. Note that the criterion of classicality here is entirely proof-theoretic, as is assumed e.g. in [8] .
Subcontrariety: two sentences are subcontraries if one of them is true whenever the other is not true.
Call two sentences contradictories if they are contraries and subcontraries. Liberal generalizes the usual classical notion of contradictoriness so that it applies in a non-classical setting. In a classical setting, where truth and falsity are exclusive and exhaustive, falsity is simply untruth, and thus the above account is equivalent to the more familiar traditional account according to which:
• two sentences are contraries if they cannot be true together;
• two sentences are subcontraries if they cannot be false together.
Liberal uniquely secures classical negation when truth and falsity are exclusive and exhaustive-as they are classically-but it is not by itself enough to secure a single unary operation when truth and falsity interact non-classically. It can therefore serve only as a necessary condition on classical negation. Indeed it can be seen as merely one component of a definition of classical negation that generalizes to a non-classical setting. We now come to the further components of this definition.
Negations Satisfying Liberal in a Non-classical Setting
If truth and falsity are exhaustive but not exclusive (meaning we are in a paraconsistent setting where the only available values are t, f, and b), then the following two candidates satisfy Liberal:
The operator ¬ 1 is the familiar paraconsistent three-valued exclusion negation (read, 'It is not true that') while ¬ 2 (which has no intuitive reading) appears not to be a negation at all. Each operation takes a designated value to an undesignated one and conversely-a necessary requirement of any classical negation-but only ¬ 2 has the unusual property that ∼¬ 2 A is valid for arbitrary A. But no double negation composed only of de Morgan and classical negations should be valid: for any such statement intuitively has the force of an assertion (or something slightly weaker). Moreover, ¬ 2 makes any sentence false (thinking relationally) regardless of the value of that sentence. Such an operation seems to us not to be a classical negation. We therefore need an additional constraint that rules out ¬ 2 from qualifying as classical.
Let us now consider the paracomplete case where truth and falsity are exclusive but not exhaustive (meaning the only available values are t, f, and n). Here again we have two candidate negations satisfying Liberal:
The operator ¬ 3 is the familiar three-valued paracomplete exclusion negation while the other, ¬
4 , again appears not to be a negation at all; for ¬ 4 ∼¬ 4 A is valid for arbitrary A. But no triple negation composed only of de Morgan and classical negations should be valid: for any such statement intuitively has the force of a denial (or something slightly weaker). Moreover, if not every double negation ∼¬ 4 A is to be valid for arbitrary A (as we argued above), then for some invalid such double negation ∼¬ 4 B, appending B with a classical negation won't yield a validity either. Hence ¬ 4 ∼¬ 4 A shouldn't be valid for arbitrary A. We therefore need an additional constraint that rules out ¬ 4 from qualifying as classical.
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Finally, let us consider the paraconsistent and paracomplete case where truth and falsity are neither exclusive nor exhaustive (meaning all four truth values are available). Here we have sixteen candidate unary operations satisfy Liberal. Since the negation has to be undesignated (designated) when the negand is designated (undesignated), there are two possibilities for each 10 By our definition, ¬ 3 is classical since it satisfies both Liberal and Toggle. An anonymous referee questions this by considering two interesting cases. The first involves the weak Kleene interpretation of the connectives. On that interpretation, A ∨ ¬ 3 A is not a theorem (though it is when ∨ is interpreted according to the strong Kleene tables), which is to suggest that ¬ 3 cannot therefore be classical. We disagree. No operation ⊗ is such that A ∨ ⊗A will be a theorem of weak Kleene logic simply because of the non-classical interpretation given to ∨. A classical interpretation requires the truth of A ∨ B when either A is true or B is and this fails for ∨ in weak Kleene logic. We still maintain that ¬ 3 is classical even in the weak Kleene setting since it meets the required semantic criteria and since all the usual classical theorems are valid when the other connectives such as ∨ are read classically. The second case involves giving a non-standard interpretation to the consequence relation (as preservation of non-falsity) so that it is not taken as the smallest relation preserving truth over all models. Relative to some such consequence relations, the inference from e.g. A to ¬ 3 ¬ 3 A may fail. This does not by our lights show that ¬ 3 fails to be classical simply because the consequence relation does not cohere with the usual understanding of the truth values in the present non-classical setting.
input. And since there are four kinds of inputs, we obtain 2 4 = 16 possibilities. However, again not each of these possibilities counts as a classical negation; for example, just as in the paraconsistent case, the following fourvalued counterpart ¬ 5 of ¬ 2 satisfies Liberal:
As such, ∼¬ 5 A is valid for arbitrary A, and this rules it out as being a classical negation on the same grounds as ¬ 2 .
The Classical Triad
In each the three-valued paraconsistent and paracomplete case, while Liberal does not by itself secure only classical negations, it does leave us with only two, one of which is clearly not classical. The following constraint seems a natural additional to Liberal in securing classical negation in a three-valued setting. We call it Toggle:
Toggle: an operation on truth values is a classical negation only if it toggles between the classical values t and f, i.e. it takes t to f and conversely.
This condition seems to us a reasonable constraint on classicality. First, because it is often taken as a definition of classical negation, though we have generalized it to a non-classical setting.
11 Second and more generally, classical operations that receive classical inputs should have classical outputs. This is already enough (in conjunction with Liberal) to secure a unique negation in the three-valued cases. Third, because there is no intuitive reading of an operation which takes a sentence that is true only or false only to one that is both true and false, or one that is neither. Yet classical negation presumably has an intuitive reading.
With Liberal and Toggle a unique classical negation is secured in the three-valued cases. The four-valued case presents a separate challenge, since these constraints do not uniquely secure a single negation. In fact, they determine the following four candidates:
So the question is whether there are additional, natural semantic constraints that, in conjunction with Liberal and Toggle, secure a unique candidate from these four. We propose the following:
Involution: an operation on truth values i is a classical negation only if i = i, i.e. the semantic equivalence of a sentence with its double negation. The triad, Liberal, Toggle and Involution, uniquely secure ¬ as the unique classical negation in the four-valued setting.
Note that, of the four candidate negations, only boolean negation is surjective. This implies that, for the non-boolean negations, A and its double negation will never be semantically equivalent for some values of A. For if some value i is not in the image of a negation, then the double negation of i must be something other than i. In particular, we have that when (the value of) A is b,
A are all t. Why think Involution should be a constraint on classicality? Certainly for to be classical, A must imply A and conversely. This may hold even when Involution fails. But the idea that this equivalence holds is surely grounded in the idea that, for any possible interpretation of the language, A and A have the same value. This is, after all, a consequence of the intended interpretation of classical negation. We should be careful here, however. Any negation satisfying Involution in a three-valued setting will have to fail either Liberal or Toggle, and these latter two conditions strike us as more to the core of classical negation than does Involution. For note that this triad of constraints is in fact equivalent to Contra, which can be taken as a definition of boolean complementation (assuming ∧ and ∨ are boolean meet and join), so one of them must go if they are to serve as a characterization of classical negation in a general setting. Involution is therefore applicable only in certain cases where Liberal and Toggle fail to be uniquely determining.
Here is a final considerations for siding with boolean negation as classical in a four-valued setting. The first is that, among the four candidates, only boolean negation is uniquely determined by the following thoroughly classical truth and falsity conditions:
• ¬A is true iff A is not true.
• ¬A is false iff A is not false.
It is important that these conditions together treat truth and falsity on a par, in the sense that both values are essentially appealed to in the truth and falsity conditions of negated sentences. It is this symmetry of the standard connectives of BD and classical logic that is absent with the three other candidate classical negations. To see this, note that while the four negations have the same truth conditions, they differ with respect to their falsity conditions, which are given as follows:
• ¬ e A is false iff A is true.
• ¬ 1 A is false iff A is true and not false (iff A is true only).
• ¬ 2 A is false iff A is true or not false (iff A is not false only).
Only the falsity condition for exclusion negation strikes us as natural. Yet it does not treat truth and falsity on a par, as does the falsity condition for boolean negation. We take this to be another reason, in the context of BD, to regard only boolean negation as classical. Let us briefly summarize the discussion so far. First, the notion of classical negation in the context of BD can be partially captured by the conditions Liberal and Toggle. In particular, Liberal and Toggle together uniquely determine the notion of classical negation in the two-and three-valued settings. In the four-valued setting, further constraints are needed if a negation is to be uniquely secured as classical. We proposed one such condition, Involution. These three conditions, Liberal, Toggle and Involution, uniquely secure boolean negation in any bounded distributive lattice, hence in the matrix for BD. Indeed, Contra is decomposable into precisely these three conditions. Finally, boolean negation is the only negation in the four-valued setting whose truth and falsity conditions, like two-valued classical negation, treat truth and falsity on a par. We took this as a final consideration for regarding boolean negation as classical in the context of BD. With that said, we do think that exclusion negation, ¬ e , comes a close second. Now that we have a grasp on the notion of classical negation, we turn to the proof-theoretic details of extending BD by classical negation.
Expanding BD with Classical Negation
We present a Hilbert style system BD+ which is the expansion of BD by classical negation. We show it (i) complete with respect to the semantics discussed in the previous section, and (ii) maximal with respect to classical logic. 
Formulation
The language L consists of the set of logical symbols S and a denumerable set, Prop, of propositional letters whose members we denote by p, q, etc. In the following, we assume that {∼, ∧, ∨} ⊆ S, and indicate the inclusion of other logical symbols of S using subscripts. Remark 2. Consider the subsystem of BD+ consisting of axioms (Ax1) through (Ax9) together with the rule of inference (MP). This system is equivalent to the negation-less fragment of CL, and we call it CL + . Moreover, the subsystem of CL + obtained by dropping (Ax3) is the negation-less fragment of intuitionistic logic, and we call it IL + . Note also that the above axiomatization is redundant in a sense that some of the axioms are provable by means of others. We present it this way to ease the comparison of BD+ with other systems. 
Soundness and Completeness
We now turn to prove the soundness and completeness of BD+ with respect to the semantics we considered earlier. We begin with a definition of a BD+-valuation. Proof. By a straightforward verification that each instance of each axiom schema always takes a designated value, and that (MP) preserves designationhood.
We now turn to completeness. We adopt the constructive method of Kalmár, used also in [6, 27] for the paraconsistent logic P 1 of Sette, and the logics LFI1 and LFI2 of Carnielli, Marcos and de Amo (see also Mendelson [14] ).
For convenience, we list some formulas that are provable in BD+.
Lemma 6. The following formulas are provable in the system BD+.
Proof. Left as an exercise for the reader.
Based on this lemma, we prove the key lemma for our completeness proof.
Lemma 7. Given a BD+-valuation v, we define for each formula A an associated formula
Now, let F be a formula whose set of atomic variables is {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n }, and let Δ v be the set {p
Proof. By induction on the number n of connectives. Outline of the proof is provided in the appendix. 3 and v 4 respectively. Putting these four results together by making use of (Ax9) and the fact that Δ
, we conclude that Δ k F . Repeating this procedure k − 1 more times gives us F as desired.
Maximality
Maximality was given as a criterion of paraconsistency independently by Jaśkowski and da Costa, and we here show that BD+ is indeed maximal. Jaśkowski required that paraconsistent systems "be rich enough to enable practical inference" ([12, p. 38]), while da Costa requires them to "contain the most part of the schemata and rules of C 0 " ([8, p. 498]) where C 0 is the classical propositional calculus. Although these criteria are rather vague, it is common to interpret them as a maximality constraint, defined as follows.
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Definition 8. Let L 1 and L 2 be logics taken as sets of formulas closed under an appropriate relation of deducibility. Then, L 1 is said to be maximal relative to L 2 if the following holds:
• The languages of L 1 and L 2 are the same;
The maximality of three-valued paraconsistent logics is relatively well discussed in the literature. In particular, in [2] , some comprehensive results are presented by Arieli, Avron and Zamansky.
14 More general many-valued logics are considered in [1] in the context of what they call "ideal paraconsistent logics", though the results contained therein do not cover our case, and so we deal with it here. 15 For the purpose of stating the result, we introduce the following logic.
Definition 9. Let ECL be classical propositional logic with two classical negations in the language L →,¬ . Namely, we obtain ECL by replacing (Ax12)-(Ax16) by the two axioms A ∨ ∼A and (A ∧ ∼A) → B in the formulation of BD+.
Then the following maximality result holds.
Theorem 3. BD+ is maximal relative to ECL.
Since the first two conditions of Definition 8 are obviously satisfied, we only prove the third condition. For this purpose, we make use of an idea employed in [10] .
Lemma 10. Let G be a formula containing only one propositional variable p. Then one of the following four formulas is provable in the system BD+:
Proof. By induction on the complexity of G. 
Lemma 12. Let G be a formula containing only one propositional variable p such that ECL G and BD+ G. Then the system S obtained from the system BD+ by adjoining G as an axiom schema is equivalent to ECL. 15 More precisely, [1, p. 55, Theorem 3] provides a sufficient condition for a many-valued logic's being ideal, a condition which requires maximality in our sense. However, ideality assumes the presence of the conditional ⊃ defined as follows:
However, this conditional is not definable in BD+, as observed in Corollary 16.
Proof. By Lemmas 10 and 11, one of the following formulas are provable:
We here prove that in any of these cases, we have S ¬p ↔ ∼p is provable which is sufficient for the desired result. First, if (II) is provable, then we have S (p ↔ ∼p) → ¬G, and therefore by contraposition with respect to ¬, we get S G → ¬(p ↔ ∼p) which is equivalent to S G → (¬p ↔ ∼p). Since G is assumed as an axiom, we obtain S ¬p ↔ ∼p. Second, if (III) is provable then we have S (p ↔ ∼p) → (G ↔ ¬p) and, therefore, S (p ↔ ∼p) → (G → ¬p). By permutation and contraposition with respect to ¬, we get S G → (p → (¬p ↔ ∼p) ). Since G is assumed as an axiom, we obtain S p → (¬p ↔ ∼p). But then we also have S ¬p → (¬¬p ↔ ∼¬p), which is equivalent to S ¬p → (¬p ↔ ∼p) in view of (Ax12). Hence, together with (Ax7) and (Ax10), we reach S ¬p ↔ ∼p as desired. Finally, if (IV) is provable then the proof is similar to the previous case, the details of which are left to the reader. This completes the proof.
Lemma 13. Let G(p 1 , . . . , p n ) be a formula containing no propositional variables except p 1 , . . . , p n , such that ECL G and BD+ G. Then there are for-
Proof. Since ECL G, it is clear that for any formulas ϕ 1 (p), . . . , ϕ n (p), G (ϕ 1 (p) , . . . , ϕ n (p)) is a tautology. Therefore, we shall only prove that we can construct formulas ϕ 1 (p), . . . , ϕ n (p) so that BD+ G (ϕ 1 (p) ), . . . , ϕ n (p)).
By the assumption BD+ G and the completeness theorem, there is a BD+-valuation v 0 such that v 0 (G(p 1 , . . . , p n )) ∈ {t, b}. Given this valuation, we define ϕ k (p) as follows
Hence, we have v 0 (G(ϕ 1 (p), . . . , ϕ n (p) )) ∈ {t, b} when v 0 (p) = b, and thus BD+ G (ϕ 1 (p)), . . . , ϕ n (p) ) as desired.
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let G be a formula such that ECL G and BD+ G. Let S be the system obtained from the system BD+ by adjoining G as an axiom schema. In view of Lemma 12, it is sufficient to prove that there is a formula G which contains only one propositional variable such that ECL G and BD+ G . Given Lemma 13, we can construct such a formula from G, concluding the proof of Theorem 3.
Remark 14. If we consider maximality with respect to consequence relations, then BD+ is not maximal relative to ECL. Indeed, the addition of the rule A, ∼A B to BD+ gives us a strictly stronger system compared to BD+, and also a strictly weaker system compared to ECL. This may be observed in the truth tables that are exactly like those for the connectives of BD+ except that the designated value is restricted to only t.
The Definability of Other Negations in BD+
In light of our discussion in Sect. 2, a natural question that arises is whether any of the other candidate classical negations discussed therein (i.e. precisely those satisfying Liberal and Toggle) are definable in BD+. The answer turns out to be negative; i.e., none of ¬ e , ¬ 1 and ¬ 2 are definable in BD+. For the purpose of proving this result, we need the following lemma. 
This completes the proof.
Based on this lemma, we can prove the desired result as follows. Proof. This follows immediately by Theorem 4.
The following proof-theoretic considerations may be of interest to some readers. Consider the systems obtained by adding, respectively, ¬ e , ¬ 1 and ¬ 2 to BD, which we refer to as BDe, BD1 and BD2. For ease of exposition, we rewrite all negations and conditionals uniformly as ¬ and →. These systems are obtained by modifying only axioms (Ax12) and (Ax16) of BD+ as follows: Remark 18. BD1 and BD2 do not occur in the literature as far as we know. However, BDe is not a new system in the sense that there are at least three systems in the literature that are equivalent to it. These include i.e. B → 4 of Odintsov [18] , BD of Sano and Omori [25] , and BS4 of Omori and Waragai [21] . Moreover, the subsystem of BDe in the language L ⊃ obtained by eliminating (Ax10), (Ax11) and (Ax12) is called HBe by Avron [3] . Closely related to HBe is the subsystem obtained by replacing CL + by IL + and it is known as N4, the paraconsistent version of Nelson logic. It has been investigated by Kamide and Wansing [13] , Odinstov [19] and others.
Relations Between BD+ and Other Systems
We now wish to draw some comparisons between BD+ and some closely related systems. That these systems turn out so closely related may be surprising given the vast difference in motivation from which these systems arose. We remark on some further interesting curiosities along the way.
A Comparison of PM4N with BD+.
In [5] , Béziau considers a fourvalued modal logic inspired by a four-valued modal logic L of Lukasiewicz. One problem faced by L was that it validated inferences such as p → q |= p → q and ♦p ∧ ♦q |= ♦(p ∧ q) which are quite counter-intuitive given a necessity and possibility reading of the modalities. According to Béziau, these counterintuitive inferences are avoided in a preferred system PM4N. However, PM4N can be viewed as an expansion of BD and, in fact, as nothing more than the expansion BD+. Thus the extensional many-valued logic BD+ may be seen as a modal logic that avoids certain modal fallacies faced by its cousin L.
The language of PM4N consists of the set of logical symbols {∧, ∨, ¬, }, where obeys the following truth table:
Note here that the designated values are t and b. [4] . Whether paradoxical or not, it is somewhat surprising that what is clearly an expansion of classical logic turns out equivalent to an apparent weakening of classical logic.
Definition 21. The system FDEP consists of the following axioms together with rules of inference: Our original presentation of BD+ had (MP) as the only rule of inference, so a comparison to FDEP would be made easier if there were an equivalent presentation of FDEP without (R2). We give such a presentation shortly.
Definition 23. The system FDEP consists of the following axioms in addition to (A1)-(A6), along with sole rule of inference (R1):
We define FDEP in the same manner as FDEP .
Remark 24. The above system FDEP is a natural variation of BD+ in the following sense. Schemas (A5) and (A6) replace (Ax13) of BD+, and (A7) , (A8) and (A9) replace (Ax16) of BD+ since L ∼,→ is without primitive conjunction.
The following lemmas connect the above two systems, proofs of which are provided in the appendices. We then obtain the following result. 
Concluding Remarks
We provided a general semantic analysis of classical negation so that it is applicable in a non-classical setting. We hope this serves to settle debates concerning whether certain negations are classical or not, or whether certain negations are "genuine" or not, depending on whether e.g. they are contradictory-forming operators (in the sense of Sect. 2), a condition we take to be minimally necessary for any operator's being deemed a negation. (For an excellent updated survey on this topic, see [11] .) Our main interest of this endeavour, however, was to expand four-valued Belnap-Dunn logic by classical negation.
We then presented a Hilbert-style axiom system for the system BD+, an expansion of Belnap-Dunn logic by classical negation, which we showed is complete and maximal. We went on to compare BD+ to two related system in the literature that we find of particular interest, the modal logic of [4] and the apparent weakening of classical logic of [30] . We showed these three logics are equivalent despite their being obtained through disparate motivations. Indeed, there are a good number of interesting connections between BD+ and other systems of the literature, a topic we shall have to leave for another occasion. This completes the proof.
